An Evaluation of Constitutional Constraints on Capital Taxation by Domínguez, Begoña & Feng, Zhigang
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Economics Faculty Publications Department of Economics
8-2016
An Evaluation of Constitutional Constraints on
Capital Taxation
Begoña Domínguez
University of Queensland
Zhigang Feng
University of Nebraska at Omaha, zfeng@unomaha.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/econrealestatefacpub
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department
of Economics at DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Domínguez, Begoña and Feng, Zhigang, "An Evaluation of Constitutional Constraints on Capital Taxation" (2016). Economics Faculty
Publications. 22.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/econrealestatefacpub/22
An Evaluation of Constitutional Constraints on
Capital Taxation∗
Begoña Domínguez† Zhigang Feng‡
September 24, 2015
∗We would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. We also thank
Pedro Gomis-Porqueras, Kenneth Judd, Felix Kübler, and useful comments at several presentations. Zhigang Feng
acknowledges financial support from NCCR-FINRISK, and computational support from David Kelly, Zongjun Hu
and CCS at University of Miami. All the remaining errors are ours.
†School of Economics, The University of Queensland, Colin Clark Building (39), St Lucia, Brisbane Qld 4072,
Australia. E-mail: b.dominguez@uq.edu.au
‡Department of Economics, University of Illinois, David Kinley Hall, 1407 W. Gregory, Urbana, IL 61801, USA.
E-mail: z.feng2@gmail.com
1
Running Head: Constitutional Constraints on Capital Taxation
Corresponding author: Begoña Domínguez, School of Economics, The University of Queens-
land, Colin Clark Building (39), St Lucia, Brisbane Qld 4072, Australia. E-mail: b.dominguez@uq.edu.au
2
Abstract
This paper investigates the desirability of constitutional constraints on capital taxation
in an environment without government debt and where benevolent governments have limited
commitment. In our setup, governments can choose proportional capital and labor income
taxes subject to the constitutional constraint but cannot commit to the actual path of taxes.
First, we explore a form of constitutional constraint: a constant cap on capital tax rates. In
our quantitative exercise, we show that a three per cent cap on capital taxes provides the
highest welfare at the worst sustainable equilibrium. However, such cap decreases welfare
at the best sustainable equilibrium (both because it constrains feasibility and tightens the
incentive compatibility constraint). Second, we identify a form of constitutional constraint
that can improve all sustainable equilibria. That constraint features a cap on capital taxes
that increases with the level of capital.
JEL Codes: E61, E62, H21, H30.
Keywords: Optimal Policy; Rules vs. Discretion; Time-Consistency.
3
1 Introduction
The literature on optimal taxation provides one central conclusion: capital taxes should be very
high in the short run and zero in the long run.1 However, as time passes, governments are tempted
to revise the previously chosen capital taxes.2 Such temptation generates a well-known time-
inconsistency problem that can lead to higher capital taxes, lower capital accumulation and welfare
losses (as, for example, illustrated in Fischer (1980)). In order to alleviate this problem, several
authors have suggested to impose constitutional constraints on capital taxation.3
This paper evaluates the desirability of constitutional constraints on capital taxation. We
define a constitutional constraint as a cap on capital taxes, i.e. an exogenously imposed upper
limit on the tax rates allowed to be set on capital income. We consider an economy with benevolent
governments that have limited commitment. In order to finance public consumption, governments
choose linear capital and labor tax rates subject to the constitutional constraint but cannot commit
to the specific tax rates. Therefore, our environment is one with limited commitment in the sense
that governments can commit to the cap but not to the actual sequence of tax rates.
In this setup, we provide a quantitative evaluation of different constitutional constraints on
capital taxes by assessing their effects on the Best Sustainable Equilibrium (BSE) and the Worst
Sustainable Equilibrium (WSE). We focus on both equilibria rather than only on the best because
the coordination of beliefs required to sustain the best is not under the control of the government.4
First, we explore a form of constitutional constraint: a constant cap on capital tax rates. Our
numerical results show that welfare at the BSE increases with the cap. Then the uncapped case
delivers the highest and the zero cap the lowest welfare at the BSE. We find that the welfare
at the WSE displays an inverted U-shape relative to the cap. For our baseline parameters, the
welfare provided by the WSE is lowest at the uncapped case. Without caps, the WSE features
1See Chamley (1986), Judd (1985), and Chari and Kehoe (1998).
2Chari et al. (1994) find that 80% of the welfare gains of switching from the current tax to the optimal come
from the high initial capital taxes.
3Some authors, such as Lucas (1990) and, more recently, Mankiw et al. (2009), have suggested an extreme form
of constitutional constraint on capital taxation: the abolition of capital taxes.
4Rogoff (1987) provides an insightful discussion of the multiplicity of equilibria and the associated coordination
problems in reputational models. He writes the government can achieve some degree of coordination by placing
external restraints on itself ... amounts to changing the structure of the game so that there are less equilibria. Our
paper aims to find constitutional constraints that eliminate bad equilibria and lessen the coordination problem.
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very high capital taxes and low capital accumulation. The highest welfare at the WSE is provided
by a positive but low cap on capital taxes, more specifically at a three per cent cap.5 We explain
the results as follows. For the BSE, we find that long-run distortions are not present. At the
BSE, a cap has a direct negative effect by reducing the short-run benefits of capital taxes and an
indirect ambiguous effect through the sustainability via the welfare at the WSE. For our baseline
parameters, the overall effect is negative and lowering the cap reduces the payoff at the BSE. For
the WSE, the reduction of the cap lowers the long-run distortions at the WSE, but it also reduces
the short-run benefits of less distortionary taxation. For moderate and large caps, the first effect
dominates and the cap is welfare enhancing at the WSE. For very low caps, the second effect is
larger and the cap is welfare reducing at the WSE.
Second, we investigate whether there exists a constitutional constraint on capital taxation that
could benefit all equilibria. We find that the maximal tax rate on capital income prescribed by the
Ramsey (with full commitment) for each level of capital stock provides a natural upper limit on
capital taxation. For our balanced-budget policies, the incentives to tax capital are small (large)
for low (high) levels of capital stock. Those incentives deliver an 'optimal' cap on capital taxes
that increases with the level of capital. We show that such natural upper limit on capital taxation
can improve the welfare provided by the WSE without worsening the welfare at the BSE.
Since Kydland and Prescott (1977)'s seminal work, several papers have studied optimal capital
taxation without commitment. Chari and Kehoe (1990) use a model of intra-period capital accu-
mulation to provide a game-theoretic formulation for the taxation problem. This formulation is
extended to a dynamic setting by Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) and Sleet (1997). An alternative
approach (that rules out reputational mechanisms) is used in Klein et al. (2008). They find a
Markov-perfect equilibrium that is quantitatively close to our WSE in terms of capital taxes and
capital stock. Following the same approach, Martin (2010) analyzes the effects of bounds on taxes.6
The earlier works of Kydland and Prescott (1977), Lucas (1986) and Chari (1988) suggest
the use of institutional changes (implementation lags, monetary standards, budget balance, the
elimination of capital taxes, etc.) to ameliorate time-inconsistency problems. A recent example
5We find that the specific level of the cap that maximizes welfare at the WSE depends on the relative need of
distortionary taxation.
6Martin (2010) finds that, for some parameters, the Markov-perfect equilibrium may coincide with the WSE.
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is that of Athey et al. (2005) who study the optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy and
find that a cap on inflation can implement the best incentive-compatible equilibrium. Domínguez
(2010) studies the effects of debt limits and deficit restrictions on the time-inconsistency problems
of default and devaluation of government debt.
The rest of the paper follows the following structure. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes the policy game and quantifies the effects of different constitutional constraints. Section
4 concludes. Proofs, Tables and Figures are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Economy
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived
identical households, a continuum of perfectly competitive firms and a benevolent government.
The representative household is characterized by the following life-time utility:
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct, nt) +G(gt)] , (1)
with the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).7 The instantaneous utility u(·, ·) +G(·) is a function of private
consumption ct, labor nt and public consumption gt, and takes the following form:
u(ct, nt) +G(gt) =
ct
1−σ
1− σ − γn
nt
1+χ
1 + χ
+ γg
gt
1−σ
1− σ , (2)
where σ ≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0 are respectively the inverses of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
of consumption and of labor. The parameters γn ≥ 0 and γg ≥ 0 represent the weights on labor
disutility and on public consumption utility respectively.
Each individual is endowed with the initial capital k0. Taking prices and the government
policy as given, the representative household chooses consumption, labor and capital to maximize
his welfare (1) subject to the budget constraint
Rtkt + (1− τnt )wtnt ≥ kt+1 + ct, (3)
7The instantaneous utility is normalized by (1− β).
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and the no-Ponzi-game condition
lim
t→∞
ptkt+1 ≥ 0. (4)
Here pt is the multiplier on the budget constraint (3), wt the real wage, τ
n
t the tax rate on labor
income, Rt the gross return on capital, after tax τ
k
t and depreciation δ rates, and rt the net return
on capital, i.e. Rt = 1 + (1− τ kt )(rt − δ), at date t. The first-order conditions for this problem are
−un,t = (1− τnt )wtuc,t, (5)
uc,t = βRt+1uc,t+1, (6)
and the transversality condition limt→∞ βtuc,tkt+1 = 0, where uc and un denote the marginal utility
with respect to consumption and labor, respectively. Other derivatives follow similar notation.
A representative competitive firm produces the final good using the technology yt = f(kt, nt) =
Akαt n
1−α
t , with A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). Taking factor prices as given, the firm chooses capital and
labor to maximize profits, which implies
rt = fk(kt, nt) and wt = fn(kt, nt). (7)
We consider a benevolent government that must finance an endogenous public consumption
gt with taxes on labor income and on capital income. We restrict attention to balanced-budget
policies with no initial government debt.8 Then the per-period government's budget constraint is
τnt wtnt + τ
k
t (rt − δ)kt = gt. (8)
A key feature is that governments must comply with the constitution. In the absence of con-
stitutional constraints, we assume that the rates, τnt and τ
k
t , can take any value in the inter-
8Two reasons justify this assumption. First, even with commitment, a government would default on any initial
positive public debt. Second, our tax problem is computationally demanding and allowing for government debt
would substantially increase the dimensionality of the problem.
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val [0, τmax], with 0 < τmax ≤ 1.9,10 We let τnt ∈ T n = [0, τmax]. Then, a constitutional con-
straint on capital taxes takes the form of an upper limit on the capital tax rate, i.e. τ kt ∈ T k ={
[0, τ k,UL]|0 ≤ τ k,UL ≤ τmax} . For example, the abolition of capital taxes corresponds to τ k,UL = 0.
The resource constraint can be written as
f(kt, nt) + (1− δ)kt = ct + kt+1 + gt. (9)
Finally, we define a competitive equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1 Given the tax rates
{
τ kt , τ
n
t
}∞
t=0
, and initial capital k0, a competitive equilibrium
allocation {ct, nt, kt+1, gt}∞t=0 and prices {pt, rt, wt}∞t=0 are such that: (i) given prices, tax rates and
k0, the representative individual maximizes welfare (1) subject to the budget constraint (3) and the
no-Ponzi game condition (4); (ii) factors are paid their marginal products (7); (iii) the government
budget constraint (8) is satisfied; and (iv) all markets clear.11
3 Time-Consistent Policy subject to Constitutional Constraints
In this Section, we present the policy game and compute the time-consistent optimal fiscal policy
subject to different constitutional constraints on capital taxes. This is a form of limited commit-
ment as we allow future governments to reconsider their policy but they commit to do so within
the range allowed in the constitution.
First, we describe our policy game and provide a definition of equilibrium. Second, we formulate
the game recursively. Finally, we calibrate the economy and present our quantitative results by
showing the effect of different constitutional constraints on the set of sustainable equilibria. Among
those constitutional constraints, we identify a form that can be desirable for all equilibria.
9We require tax rates to be bounded above to guarantee that the competitive equilibrium can be written re-
cursively. This can be justified on the grounds that in a more general model there would be an endogenous upper
bound on the tax rates. For example, whenever the capital tax rate is such that Rt ≤ 1−δ, individuals would prefer
to leave capital idle (see Chamley (1986)). Similarly, for very high labor taxes, individuals may prefer not to work.
10Additionally, as in Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), we require tax rates to be non-negative, i.e. τ it ≥ 0, for
i = {k, n} . Similarly, capital taxes can be imposed only when capital income is positive (rt − δ) ≥ 0. With these
assumptions, we rule out subsidies. We discuss the relaxation of this assumption in the numerical section.
11Given that (3) and (8) hold, the resource constraint (9) is also satisfied in a competitive equilibrium.
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3.1 The Policy Game
Here we describe our dynamic game between the government and households. Before the game
starts, a set of constitutional constraints on the governments' policy choices is exogenously imposed.
All households and government understand and conform with those constitutional constraints.
Households are anonymous. Then the choices of a given household are not observed either
by the government or by other households. In accordance, we restrict attention to choices that
depend on public history. Public history is denoted by ζt = (ζ1, ..., ζt), where ζt = (τ
n
t , τ
k
t , kt+1).
12
It should be noted that, as in Feng (2015), we do not require a public randomization device.
In our sequential equilibria, the government chooses first. A strategy for the government at
date t, denoted σG,t(ζ
t−1), is a choice of current taxes (subject to the constitutional constraints) as
a function of the history ζt=1, i.e.
(
τnt , τ
k
t
)
= σG,t(ζ
t−1). Households choose second. A symmetric
strategy for them at date t, denoted σH,t(ζ
t), is a choice of a current allocation as a function of
the public history (ζt−1, τnt , τ
k
t ), i.e. (ct, nt, kt+1) = σH,t(ζ
t−1, τnt , τ
k
t ).
13 After each history ζt−1,
a strategy profile (σG, σH) induces a continuation strategy profile. A strategy profile induces an
outcome, which produces a payoff for the government and a payoff for the households. Now we
define the conditions under which a symmetric strategy profile (σG, σH) is a sustainable equilibrium.
Definition 2 A symmetric strategy profile (σG, σH) is a sustainable equilibrium if it satisfies the
following conditions for all t ≥ 0:
(i) given the symmetric strategy for households σH,t, the continuation payoff for the government is
higher than the payoff from any deviation to a different strategy σ˜G,t for every history ζ
t−1; and
(ii) given the strategy for the government σG,t, the continuation payoff for the household is higher
than the payoff from any deviation to a different strategy σ˜H,t for every history (ζ
t−1, τnt , τ
k
t ).
The above definition builds on two conditions that guarantee sequential rationality (as in Chari
and Kehoe (1990) and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001)). The first requires the government not to
12As discussed by Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), there is no need to include the history of the distributions of all
choices made by households (even if they are publicly observed), because all households choose the same actions
along the equilibrium. In addition, there is no need to include the household's private history when they make
choices, because the convexity of the household's problem ensures the optimality of on-the-path behavior.
13Market clearing determines the returns to capital and labor, rt and wt. After the households decide, the
collected tax revenue determines the level of public consumption gt.
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have incentives to deviate and the second requires individuals to behave competitively.
3.2 A Recursive Formulation for our Policy Game
The APS method (Abreu et al. (1990)) shows that a repeated game can be written recursively
by adding as a state variable a continuation value (that is an equilibrium payoff of the repeated
game beginning next period). In an environment similar to ours, Phelan and Stacchetti (2001)
extend the APS method to policy games with natural state variables (such as capital) between the
government and a continuum of households. In addition to a continuation value for the government,
they incorporate the marginal value of capital as a continuation value for the households. Both
values are equilibrium payoffs of the game beginning next period, which depend on the next period
capital stock, and summarize all relevant information about the future.
3.2.1 Competitive Equilibria in Recursive Form
The main idea is to think of our dynamic economy as a sequence of static economies (which
are explained below) for which the state variables evolve endogenously and according to their
appropriate laws of motion.
Let's denote the marginal value of capital as mt+1, i.e.
mt+1 ≡ uc,t+1[1 + (1− τ kt+1)(rt+1 − δ)], (10)
which is as in Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), except for that capital depreciation is tax-deductible.
For a given exogenous mt+1, and given τ
k
t , τ
n
t , and kt, the household's static problem is defined as
follows:
max
{ct,nt,kt+1}
u(ct, nt) +G(gt) + βmt+1kt+1
subject to the budget constraint (3).
Given mt+1 as in (10), this recursive problem (the above static problem considered in each
period) is equivalent to the sequential problem for the household stated in Section 2.
Proposition 1 For our utility function (2) and production function yt = Ak
α
t n
1−α
t and provided
10
mt+1 is defined as in (10), the recursive and the sequential problems for the household are equivalent.
Proof. See the Appendix. P
For mt+1 as in (10), the optimality conditions of the above static problem are Equations (5)-(6)
of the sequence problem. In addition, we show that the transversality condition holds.14
For a vector (kt, τ
k
t , τ
n
t ,mt+1), this static economy consists of the household's static problem,
the firm's problem (which is static) and the government's budget constraint (8). Denoting next
period variables with subscript + , a competitive equilibrium for the static economy is as follows:
Definition 3 The vector (c, n, k+, g, w, r) constitutes a competitive equilibrium of the above static
economy, denoted (c, n, k+, g, w, r) ∈ CE(k, τ k, τn,m+), if and only if
uc(c, n) = βm+, (CE-1)
−un = (1− τn)wuc, (CE-2)
k+ = [1 + (1− τ k)(r − δ)]k + (1− τn)wn− c, (CE-3)
g = τnwn+ τ k(r − δ)k, (CE-4)
w = fn(k, n), (CE-5)
r = fk(k, n). (CE-6)
Moreover, provided m+ is defined as in Equation (10), it follows from Proposition 1 that for
given
{
τ kt , τ
n
t
}∞
t=0
, and k0, a sequence {ct, nt, kt+1, gt, wt, rt}∞t=0 that is a competitive equilibrium of
the static economy in each period, is also a competitive equilibrium of our dynamic economy.
We can now define the equilibrium value correspondence of our dynamic economy. Let's denote
the value for the government as h = u(c, n) + G(g) + βh+. Our recursive formulation requires a
continuation value for households, denoted m+, and a continuation value for the government,
denoted h+, to define the set of values (m,h) that can be attained in a sustainable equilibrium.
For a given initial capital k, this set of values is called the equilibrium value correspondence V(k).
14Our proof extends those of Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) and Feng (2015) by allowing for a utility function that
does not satisfy lim
n→1
u(., n) = −∞.
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3.2.2 Self-Generation
Exploiting the recursivity of the problem and imposing the conditions for a sustainable equilib-
rium, the equilibrium value correspondence can be found as a fixed point of an arbitrary value
correspondence that contains V(k). We first define an arbitrary value correspondence W as any
mapping from k into sets of payoffs (m,h). Then we define consistency:
Definition 4 The vector ψ = (τ k, τn, c, n, k+, g, w, r,m+, h+) is said to be consistent with respect
to the value correspondence W at k if (c, n, k+, g, w, r) ∈ CE(k, τ k, τn,m+), τ i ∈ T i, for i =
{k, n}, (m,h) ∈W(k), and (m+, h+) ∈W(k+), where the payoffs for the households and for the
government are given as
m(k, ψ) := uc(c, n)[1 + (1− τ k)(r − δ)], (11)
h(k, ψ) := u (c, n) +G(g) + βh+. (12)
Next, we define admissibility as follows:
Definition 5 The vector ψ = (τ k, τn, c, n, k+, g, w, r,m+, h+) is said to be admissible with respect
to the value correspondence W at k if it is consistent and
h(k, ψ) ≥ h˜(k, ψ˜), (13)
with ψ˜ = (τ˜ k, τ˜n, c˜, n˜, k˜+, g˜, w˜, r˜, m˜+, h˜+), and where h˜(k, ψ˜) is the worst possible payoff for the
government when it deviates, that is,
h˜(k, ψ˜) = max
τ˜k,τ˜n
{
min
c˜,n˜,k˜+,(m˜+,h˜+)∈W(h˜+)
[
u(c˜, n˜) +G(g˜) + βh˜+
]}
,
such that (c˜, n˜, k˜+, g˜, w˜, r˜) ∈ CE
(
k, τ˜ k, τ˜n, m˜+
)
and τ˜ i ∈ T i for i = {k, n}.15
Thus, admissibility captures the two conditions required in the definition of a sustainable
equilibrium. Through consistency, it satisfies that individuals behave competitively. Through the
15Note that ψ˜ = (τ˜k, τ˜n, c˜, n˜, k˜+, g˜, w˜, r˜, m˜+, h˜+) is then also consistent with respect toW at k.
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incentive compatibility constraint (13), it implies that the government does not want to deviate.
As in Abreu et al. (1990), the government does not need to evaluate the consequences of all
possible actions, it suffices to consider the payoff associated with the best deviation.
It is worth noticing that the constitutional constraints on taxation affect admissibility directly
and indirectly. The direct effect is by reducing the number of competitive equilibria that are
consistent and the taxes that can be imposed in the best deviation (the worst). This direct effect
induces an indirect effect by restricting the expectations that households can hold.
We then define an operator B, B : A→ A, where A is the space of all value correspondences.
The operator B is the convex hull of all sets (m,h) that satisfy admissibility (and therefore con-
sistency). That is, the payoffs (m,h) that form part of a sustainable equilibrium. Computing the
mapping B amounts to find a set B(W), that is the set of (m,h) that can be enforced today
B(W)(k) =
{
(m,h)|∃(τ k, τn, c, n, k+, g, w, r,m+, h+) that are admissible w.r.t. Wat k
}
.
Then, Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) show that an arbitrary value correspondence containing V
converges to the equilibrium value correspondence. Their results (which apply to our setup) can
be summarized as:
1. IfW ⊆ B(W), then B(W) ⊆W.
2. V is compact and the largest set ofW such thatW = B(W).
3. B(.) is monotone and preserves compactness.
4. If we defineWr+1 = B(Wr) for all r ≥ 0, and the equilibrium value correspondence is such
that V ⊂W0, then lim
r→∞
Wr = V.
Our quantitative results rely on a numerical implementation of the above iterative method and
deliver an outer approximation of the equilibrium value correspondence.
To facilitate the computation of B(W), Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) introduce a public ran-
domization device to convexify the equilibrium set in order to apply the approximation technique
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developed by Judd et al. (2003). Instead, in line with Feng (2015), we assume thatW is convex-
valued at given (k,m) and use the method developed in that paper to approximate equilibrium
sets. As argued in Feng (2015), the assumption thatW is convex-valued is weaker than assuming
that the value correspondence is convex. This assumption implies continuity in h inside [h, h¯].
More specifically, for given (k,m), there exist strategies that support any h ∈ [h, h¯], where h and
h¯ are the lower and upper boundaries ofW(k), that is
h¯(k,m) := max
h
{h|(m,h) ∈W(k)} , (14)
h(k,m) := min
h
{h|(m,h) ∈W(k)} . (15)
For a given k, the lowest value in W(k) yields the worst value for the government h˜(k) =
minm h(k,m), which corresponds to the Worst Sustainable Equilibrium. Similarly, the highest
value maxm h¯(k,m) inW(k) corresponds to the Best Sustainable Equilibrium.
We refer to Feng et al. (2014) for details in the approximation of convex-valued sets and for
Feng (2015) for an application of the algorithm to a similar game (and for recovering the strategies).
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
3.3.1 Calibration
We start with a benchmark economy: a calibration of an initial steady state that corresponds to
an economy with similar policy and statistics to those of the US. This initial steady state provides
initial capital and parameters for our quantitative exercise. We also use this benchmark economy
as a reference against which to compute the welfare gains/losses of a particular equilibrium.
Our calibration relies substantially on that of Chari et al. (1994). More specifically, parameter
values are chosen such that certain moments in the initial steady state allocation are consistent
with the U.S. data. We consider the utility function (2) and a Cobb-Douglas production function
yt = Ak
α
t n
1−α
t . In our simulations one period corresponds to one year. We assume a capital share
in production of 0.34 and a depreciation rate of 0.08. The discount factor is chosen to obtain a
capital to output ratio of 2.71 in the initial steady state. In the utility function the degree of
14
relative risk aversion σ is set equal to unity and the labor-supply elasticity is set so that χ= 0.32.16
The weight on labor is chosen so that hours worked is 0.23 in the initial steady state, which is
in the range found by time allocation studies based on microeconomic evidence [c.f. Juster and
Stafford (1991)]. The weight on public consumption γg is chosen so that the government spending
to output ratio in the social planner's solution coincides with the one of our initial steady state,
which is close to 19 per cent. This number represents the non-Social Security government spending
in the U.S.. We later perform sensitivity analysis with respect to γg to consider higher needs of
distortionary taxation. For the initial steady state, the tax rates on capital and labor income are
set equal to 27.1 and 23.7 per cent respectively, which are in the range of the average U.S. tax
rates estimated by Mendoza et al. (1994). Table 1 shows our calibration targets and Table 2
summarizes the parameter values used in the initial steady state and for our baseline economy.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.]
Given the above parameter values and the initial condition for the capital stock provided by the
initial steady state, we use an algorithm that implements the iterative method described before to
solve for the optimal time-consistent fiscal policy subject to different constitutional constraints.17
In what follows, we present our quantitative results.
3.3.2 A Constant Cap on Capital Taxes
In this Section, we explore a form of constitutional constraint: a constant cap on capital taxes.
For our baseline parameters, our results are illustrated in Figures 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4 and Table 3.
[Insert Figures 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4 and Table 3 about here.]
Figure 1 presents the set of sustainable equilibria for different constant caps on capital taxes for
a given initial capital stock k0. In particular, we consider τ
k ∈ [0, τ k,UL] and let τ k,UL vary between
0 and 0.90.18 We find that all value correspondences are flat at the bottom, with a large number
16For the given capital share, this elasticity of labor supply allows us to solve for labor analytically in one of
the steps of the computation. This reduces the time required for computation substantially and has allowed us to
improve the accuracy in the computation.
17We discretize the state space with 400 equally spaced points for k ∈ [0.01, 1.5], 400 points for m, and 100 points
for τ ∈ [0, 0.9]. We use linear interpolation for variable values falling outside of the grid. We ran our C++ MPI
code using an IBM iDataPlex cluster, with 50 Intel Sandy Bridge 2.6GHZ processors.
18As mentioned, we proxy the absence of constitutional constraints as τk, τn ∈ [0.0, 0.90] and constant caps on
capital taxes as τk ∈ T k = [0, τk,UL] while τn ∈ Tn = [0, 0.90].
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of marginal values of capital m supporting the WSE, and characterized by an inverted U-shape
at the top, with a smaller number of marginal values of capital m sustaining better equilibria and
just one m sustaining the BSE.
The largest set of sustainable equilibria corresponds to the uncapped case, which nearly contains
the sets for all caps. The imposition of a 0.50 constant cap on capital taxes increases slightly the
payoff at the WSE, reduces the payoff at the BSE and eliminates a large set of low marginal values
of capital. Relative to the 0.50 cap, the 0.30 cap has a similar effect. As the cap is further lowered,
high marginal values of capital are also eliminated and the effect on welfare at the WSE becomes
more pronounced. The smallest set is the one with the cap τ k,UL = 0.03. Reducing the cap from
0.03 to 0 expands the set. Then, in general but not in all specific cases, the imposition of caps
moves the set of sustainable equilibria towards the top center of the set for the uncapped case.
Figure 2 displays the payoffs provided by the BSE and the WSE for different τ k,UL. The payoff
of the BSE increases monotonically with τ k,UL. Thus, the highest payoff at the BSE is provided
by the uncapped case and the lowest payoff by the zero cap. Compared to the BSE, a cap on
capital taxes has a larger level effect on the WSE. Moreover, the payoff at the WSE displays an
inverted U-shape relative to the cap τ k,UL. For our benchmark economy, we find that the payoff
at the WSE increases relatively little as the cap is reduced from 0.90 to 0.20, increases sharply as
the cap goes from 0.20 to 0.03 and then decreases markedly as the cap is reduced from 0.03 to 0.
Our computation recovers the strategies that can implement the above equilibria. These strate-
gies (allocations and policies) are not unique.19 Some of those allocations and policies are illustrated
in Table 3, Figures 3a and 3b and Figure 4.
Table 3 shows the steady state allocations and policies and the resulting steady state and
overall welfare. We find that the BSE does not coincide with the Ramsey equilibrium for high
caps, but it does for caps below 0.10. The BSE for all caps delivers welfare gains relative to the
initial steady state. For all caps, we find that the BSE displays long-run capital taxes, labor taxes,
capital to output ratios and government to output ratios very similar to those in the Ramsey
19There are two reasons for that. First, as mentioned before, there is a continuum of marginal values of capital
m that can sustain the WSE. Second, for a given m, there are multiple combinations of tax instruments that can
deliver the same payoff for the government. This multiplicity is illustrated in Figure 4.
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equilibrium (which do not vary with the cap).20,21 Accordingly, a lower cap has little effect on
the long-run welfare but reduces the overall welfare provided by the BSE. We find that the WSE
delivers welfare losses relative to the initial steady state and that those losses vary substantially
with the cap. Those losses are negligible at τ k,UL = 0.03, and larger as the cap moves away from
that level. In the uncapped case, the WSE is very bad and displays long-run capital taxes that are
as high as 80 per cent and capital stocks that are 78 per cent lower than in the Ramsey allocation.
As the cap is reduced, the long-run burden of taxation shifts from capital to labor income. This
reduces the long-run distortions at the WSE. For very low caps, this is illustrated by the relatively
high steady-state welfare and by capital to output ratios very similar to those in the Ramsey. For
caps between zero per cent and 10 per cent (30 per cent and 90 per cent), the WSE displays some
degree of underprovision (overprovision) of government spending.
The paths for the simulated capital stock, capital taxes and labor taxes during the transition
for the different caps on capital taxes at the BSE (WSE) are depicted in Figure 3a (3b). As the
cap is reduced, the burden of taxation at the WSE is permanently shifted from capital to labor
income. However, at the BSE, such a shift is short-lived and within few periods all BSE present a
similar level of labor taxation. For the WSE, the cap on capital taxes binds for many periods (even
for high caps). This is not the case at the BSE. For the BSE, we see that as the cap decreases, the
number of periods in which it binds increases. Therefore, it seems that for low caps, a commitment
to a cap is almost identical to a commitment to an actual path of capital taxes.
Figure 3b shows the strategies that supports the WSE payoff for a given m. If we pick a
different m within the equilibrium set, the allocations and policies are different. This is illustrated
in Figure 4. The same payoff may be sustained with high capital taxes and low labor taxes or with
low and volatile capital taxes and high labor taxes. This may explain why a reduction of the cap
from 0.90 to 0.20 eliminates more 'good' equilibria than 'bad' equilibria, as very different policies
may be able to sustain the payoff at the WSE.
In summary, we find that lowering the constant cap on capital taxes τ k,UL decreases the BSE
20Albanesi and Armenter (2012) provide a sufficient condition for ruling out permanent intertemporal distortions
in the second best. Our environment does not satisfy such a condition, but still our third best policy (the BSE with
no constitutional constraints) does not feature significant long-run intertemporal distortions.
21Stockman (2001) provides a quantitative analysis of Ramsey taxation under balanced-budget rules.
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but has a non-monotonic effect on the WSE. For the WSE, the reduction of the cap lowers the
long-run distortions at the WSE, but it also reduces the short-run benefits of less distortionary
taxation.22 For large caps, the first effect dominates and the cap is welfare enhancing at the WSE.
For low caps, the second effect is larger and a further reduction of the cap is welfare reducing at the
WSE. For the BSE, we find that long-run distortions are not present. At the BSE, a cap reduces the
short-run benefits of capital taxation and indirectly affects the incentive compatibility constraint
(ICC) through the payoff at the WSE. As explained above, the second effect may be reinforcing (if
it tightens the ICC) or weakening (if it loosens the ICC). For our baseline parameters, the overall
effect is negative and lowering the cap reduces the payoff at the BSE.
Figures 5 and 6 provide sensitivity analysis with respect to the weight on government con-
sumption and the risk aversion parameter.23 Figure 5 depicts the payoff at the WSE and BSE for
different caps for γg = 0.49. This higher weight on government consumption implies larger needs
of distortionary taxation.24 We find that, as before, the BSE increases with the cap and the WSE
displays an inverted U-shape relative to the cap. But now the fifteen per cent cap is the one that
provides the highest welfare at the WSE. Then, for higher needs of distortionary taxation, the
'best' constant cap on capital taxes at the WSE is higher. Moreover, starting with the uncapped
case, declines in the cap have a larger positive effect on the payoff at the WSE.
[Insert Figures 5 and 6.]
Figure 6 shows the payoff at the WSE and at the BSE for different constant caps on capital
taxes for a higher risk aversion parameter (σ = 1.50). Figure 6 shows a pattern very similar to
that of Figure 2. The payoff at the BSE increases with the cap. The payoff at the WSE displays
an inverted U-shape and 3 per cent is again the cap that provides the highest payoff. The main
difference is that, starting with the uncapped case, lowering the cap improves the payoff at the
WSE relatively more than under the benchmark parameterization. This may be explained as
22We thank a Referee for this insight.
23We do not provide sensitivity analysis with respect to the labor elasticity. We have chosen the labor elasticity
so that a particular step in the computation can be solved analytically. This has allowed us to increase substantially
the accuracy of our approximations. Our intuition is that when labor supply is less elastic, the benefits of raising
capital taxes (so that the government can reduce labor taxes and the distortions against labor) would decrease;
then, the government's incentives to set high capital taxes in the WSE would be lower. Then, for a less elastic labor
supply, we expect that an optimal cap on capital taxes would not affect as much the set of sustainable equilibria.
24For this parameterization, the welfare gains of a Ramsey tax reform are larger than for our baseline parameters
and equal to 3.4 per cent of permanent increase in initial steady state private consumption.
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follows. With a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution, individuals are less responsive to
higher capital taxes and the government at the WSE may face higher incentives to increase capital
taxes. There a cap in capital taxes should bind more and in turn have a larger impact on welfare.
In our setup, we have ruled out subsidies. However, Martin (2010) finds that subsidies on labor
income are optimal when there is a generous upper bound on capital taxes and non-existent when
capital cannot be taxed. Consistent with that, we find that labor taxes are strictly positive at
the WSE for caps below 0.50. Looking at Figures 2, 5 and 6, our conjecture is that allowing for
subsidies would not affect the best constant cap at the WSE, but it would affect the steepness of
both the WSE and the BSE for high caps.
3.3.3 The Natural Upper Limit on Capital Taxation
In the previous Section, we have examined the effects of constant caps on capital taxation. Overall,
we have learned that a positive but low cap on capital taxation maximizes the welfare at the WSE.
However, such cap has obvious costs at the BSE. In this Section, we explore whether there exists
a constitutional constraint on capital taxes that could improve all equilibria. That is, a rule that
could improve the WSE without worsening the BSE.
The answer to the above question is yes. For balanced-budget policies, the Ramsey provides
us with a natural upper limit on capital taxation. Consider the Ramsey without constitutional
constraints, where τn, τ k ∈ [0, τmax]. While for high levels of capital stock, Ramsey capital taxes
are high in the short-run. For low levels of capital, Ramsey capital taxes may be moderate and
optimally below τmax even in the initial period. Then, let us define the natural upper limit on
capital taxation (NULKT) as the highest level of capital taxes for a given level of capital stock
that a Ramsey planner would prescribe (starting from any initial conditions).25 Figure 7 illustrates
the NULKT for our baseline parameters and depicts a maximum tax on capital income that is not
longer constant but increases with the level of capital.
[Insert Figure 7 about here.]
Consider a situation in which the BSE coincides with the Ramsey. That is, the worst is so bad
25In our numerical exercise, the highest optimal level of capital taxes for a given level of capital stock coincides
with the Ramsey capital tax in the initial period for that level of capital stock as initial condition.
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that the Ramsey can be sustained as the best. Let us now impose the NULKT as the constitutional
constraint. First, the NULKT is likely to improve the WSE, as it rules out worst expectations
that induce high capital taxes when the stock of capital is low. Second, the NULKT is likely not
to affect the feasibility of the BSE, as the NULKT does not bind at the Ramsey. However, as
the welfare of the WSE increases, the incentive compatibility constraint (13) tightens and it may
decrease the BSE (if it binds) or may not affect the BSE (if it does not bind). Therefore, the
NULKT has the potential of improving all equilibria.
For our baseline parameters and without caps, the BSE does not coincide with the Ramsey.
Nevertheless, Figure 8 shows that the NULKT improves dramatically the payoff at the WSE, but
has a very small negative effect on the payoff at the BSE. This is illustrated in Table 4 and Figures
9a and 9b. Table 4 shows that the BSE displays no long-run distortions and provides a welfare that
is close to the uncapped case (displayed in Table 3). This Table also shows that long-run taxes
and capital to output ratios are larger at the WSE with the NULKT. Figures 9a and 9b present
the simulated stock of capital, capital tax rates and labor tax rates during the transition for the
BSE and the WSE for the uncapped case and when the NULKT is imposed. Both environments
deliver very similar transitions at the BSE, but very different ones at the WSE. At the WSE, the
NULKT displays lower levels of capital taxes and induces a larger accumulation of capital.
[Insert Table 4 and Figures 8, 9a and 9b about here.]
Next, we consider a larger weight on public consumption (γg = 0.49). Figures 10 and 11
respectively depict the NULKT and the value correspondences without caps and with the NULKT.
Comparing Figure 10 to Figure 7, the larger weight on public consumption induces higher incentives
to tax capital for each level of capital. For this parameterization, the BSE coincides with the
Ramsey, and Figure 11 shows that the NULKT improves the WSE without worsening the BSE.
This constitutional constraint proves optimal as it eliminates only 'bad' equilibria.26
[Insert Figures 10 and 11 about here.]
26In this paper, we have not computed the expected social welfare of the implementation of a constitutional
constraint. We do not do so because it is unclear how to assign probabilities to each of the multiple sustainable
equilibria. However, if all of the continuum of equilibria were assumed to be equiprobable, then we could certainly
claim that this optimal constitutional constraint increases expected social welfare, as it benefits the entire set of
sustainable equilibria.
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4 Conclusions
We have investigated the desirability of constitutional constraints on capital taxation in economies
where governments lack full commitment and have no access to government debt.
We have studied constant caps on capital tax rates. In our quantitative exercise, we found that
the welfare provided by the worst sustainable equilibrium displays an inverted U-shape relative to
the cap and that a three per cent cap on capital taxes provides the highest welfare at the worst.
However, such cap decreases welfare at the best sustainable equilibrium.
We have identified a form of constitutional constraint that could benefit all equilibria. We
have found that the maximal tax rate prescribed by the Ramsey planner for each level of capital
provides a natural upper limit on capital taxation. Such natural upper limit on capital taxation
(which increases with the level of capital) can improve the worst without worsening the best.
There are several interesting extension to our analysis. One important extension would be to
allow for government debt. As shown by Domínguez (2007) and Reis (2013), this assumption can
affect the properties of capital taxation without commitment. Another interesting extension would
be to consider environments where capital (or capital income) can contemporaneously respond to
changes in capital taxes. Two examples are the following. Conesa and Domínguez (2013) consider
an economy where firms can react to current capital taxes through intangible investment (which can
be expensed or sweat). Gervais and Mennunni (2015) allow for investment to become productive
within the period. In both frameworks, the incentives to tax capital heavily in the short run are very
limited and upper bounds on capital taxes never bind. The properties and the effects of optimal
constitutional constraints on capital taxation could be quite different in those environments.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The main difference between our environment and those of Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) and Feng
(2015) is that our utility function (2) does not satisfy lim
n→1
u(., n) = −∞. However, it is easy to
see that as long as labor is bounded above, the results developed in Lemmas 1-3 of Phelan and
Stacchetti (2001) and extended in Feng (2015) also hold in our environment.
Let's proceed by contradiction and suppose there could be a competitive equilibrium for which
labor n tends to infinity. Then there are three possibilities: k
n
could approach (i) zero, (ii) a
constant value, or (iii) infinity. First, it is easy to see that (i) would violate optimality. For the
given utility and production functions, the consumption-leisure decision (CE-2) can be written as
γnn
χcσ = (1− τn)(1− α)A ( k
n
)α
. As k
n
approaches zero, this equation would require consumption
c to go to zero. Then, given the Inada conditions, the individual would be better off by working
less. Second, one can check that (ii) can never occur. As k
n
approaches a constant value, condition
(CE-2) requires nχcσ to approach a constant value. However, from (CE-5)-(CE-6) a constant k
n
implies constant w and r. Moreover, dividing the government budget constraint (CE-4) by labor,
a constant k
n
implies a constant g
n
. Likewise, dividing the household's budget constraint (CE-3) by
labor, constant k
n
, w, r and g
n
require a constant c
n
. This last would imply that consumption also
tends to infinity, which contradicts nχcσ approaching a constant value. Third, let's consider (iii),
where k
n
approaches infinity. For our production function, this implies that the returns to capital
approach zero. In the spirit of Phelan and Stacchetti (2001)'s Lemma 1, as the returns to capital
are very low, a household would prefer to save a little bit less and that would further increase
consumption. Then, for all possibilities, we reach a contradiction. Therefore, labor is bounded
above n ≤ n¯.
For n ≤ n¯, one can define an upper bound for the capital stock as k¯ = f(k¯, n¯) + (1− δ)k¯. Then
it is straight-forward to reproduce Lemmas 1-3 of Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) and extended in
Feng (2015). P
25
5.2 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Targets in the Initial Steady State
β Target: k¯
y
= 2.71
γn Target: n¯ = 0.23
γg Target:
gplanner
yplanner
= g¯
y
Table 2: Parameter Values for the Baseline Economy
Preference β = 0.968 σ = 1.0 γn = 7.694 χ = 0.32 γg = 0.333
Technology A = 1.0 α = 0.34 δ = 0.08
Policy τn0 = 0.237 τ
k
0 = 0.271
Table 3: Welfare Gains and Final Steady State Allocation and Policy for Different Constant Caps
on Capital Taxes
Uncapped 0.50 cap 0.30 cap 0.10 Cap 0.03 Cap Zero Cap
R BSE WSE R BSE WSE R BSE WSE R BSE WSE R BSE WSE R BSE WSE
∆h0 0.80 0.78 −4.32 0.62 0.48 −4.13 0.48 0.38 −3.94 0.28 0.28 −2.88 0.18 0.18 −0.02 0.15 0.15 −1.02
∆h 2.02 2.02 −22.1 2.02 1.45 −7.23 2.02 1.69 −5.97 2.02 1.91 −4.03 2.02 1.80 1.75 2.02 1.90 0.58
τ¯k 0.00 0.01 0.80 0.00 0.02 0.45 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
τ¯n 0.29 0.28 0.04 0.29 0.32 0.11 0.29 0.29 0.12 0.29 0.28 0.20 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.27
k 1.19 1.19 0.42 1.19 1.17 0.86 1.19 1.19 0.89 1.19 1.19 0.89 1.19 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.17
k¯
y
3.00 2.99 1.42 3.00 3.09 2.43 3.00 2.99 2.42 3.00 2.99 2.30 3.00 2.98 2.98 3.00 3.00 2.97
g¯
y
0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18
Table 4: Welfare Gains and Final Steady State Allocation and Policy for the NULKT
NULKT
R BSE WSE
∆h0 0.80 0.68 −1.21
∆h 2.02 1.90 −3.12
τ¯k 0.00 0.00 0.68
τ¯n 0.29 0.29 0.09
k 1.19 1.19 0.62
k¯
y
3.00 3.00 1.86
g¯
y
0.19 0.19 0.19
Note: R stands for Ramsey. ∆h0 (∆h) represents overall (steady state) welfare gains measured in
terms of % change in initial steady state private consumption.
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Figure 1: The Set of Sustainable Equilibria for Different Constant Caps on Capital Taxes
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Figure 2: Welfare at the WSE and BSE for Different Constant Caps on Capital Tax Rates
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Figure 3: Capital Stock, Capital Taxes and Labor Taxes during the Transition for Different Caps
on Capital Taxes
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(b) WSE
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.5
1
1.5
Time
Ca
pi
ta
l s
to
ck
Capital stock in simulation
 
 
uncapped
tk=0.50
tk=0.30
tk=0.10
tk=0.03
tk=0.00
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.5
1
Time
Ca
pi
ta
l t
ax
Capital tax in simulation
 
 
uncapped
tk=0.50
tk=0.30
tk=0.10
tk=0.03
tk=0.00
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Time
La
bo
r t
ax
Labor tax in simulation
 
 
uncapped
tk=0.50
tk=0.30
tk=0.10
tk=0.03
tk=0.00
28
Figure 4: Simulated Paths for Different m for the WSE with τ k,UL = 0.50
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Figure 5: Welfare at the WSE and BSE for Different τ k,UL, γg = 0.49
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Figure 6: Welfare at the WSE and BSE for Different τ k,UL, σ = 1.50
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Figure 7: The Natural Upper Limit on Capital Tax Rates
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Figure 8: The Set of Sustainable Equilibria: Uncapped vs the NULKT
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Figure 9: Capital Stock, Capital Taxes and Labor Taxes during the Transition: Uncapped vs. the
NULKT
(a) BSE
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Figure 10: The Natural Upper Limit on Capital Tax Rates, γg = 0.49
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Figure 11: The Set of Sustainable Equilibria: Uncapped vs the NULKT, γg = 0.49
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